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INTRODUCTION
Designing a broad tax base that provides stable and 
sustainable sources of revenue with minimal economic 
distortion is a central policy objective of tax authorities 
worldwide. The examination of ways to improve the 
resilience of tax revenue streams to economic fluctua-
tions has led to a discussion of the feasibility and desir-
ability of including household wealth in the tax base in 
some way. For example, wealth taxes were re-intro-
duced in response to the financial crisis in Spain and 
introduced on a temporary basis in Iceland. These initi-
atives were followed by broader debates on the poten-
tial for one-off capital levies in highly-indebted Euro-
pean countries (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014) and the 
inclusion of an analysis of regular taxation of wealth in 
the wide-ranging report on the UK tax system (Mirrlees 
et al. 2011).
This paper looks at a range of different wealth tax 
structures and their potential impact in terms of popu-
lation coverage and tax yield using household level 
data on wealth in Ireland. We calculate a number of sce-
narios based on stylised examples of wealth tax struc-
tures similar to those in existence in other European 
countries. Our results give a wide range of possible sce-
narios; applying other country models shows how vari-
ations in the exemptions and thresholds can result in 
less than 1% to almost 50% of households being liable 
to a wealth tax. The scenarios we investigate show that 
varying the level of the threshold is the key determinant 
of the number of households that will be affected, 
which is in keeping with the concentration of wealth at 
the upper end of the wealth distribution. Given the 
numbers of households affected, the treatment of the 
household’s main residence (which is the largest asset 
for almost all households, apart from the very wealthi-
est) is an important factor in the level of average tax 
payment and hence total revenues raised. 
1  This work was carried out as part of the joint ESRI-Department of Fi-
nance/Revenue Commissioners research programme on Taxation and the 
Macro-economy. The Household Finance and Consumption Survey used in 
this analysis was collected by the Central Statistics Office in coordination 
with the Central Bank of Ireland and anonymised micro-data made available 
under the terms of the Statistics Act, 1993. The authors would like to thank 
Paul M. Crowley and Gerry Reilly of the CSO for their help with the data. We 
would also like to thank Alan Ahearne, Kieran McQuinn, David Hegarty, Gary 
Tobin, Edgar Morgenroth, Kevin Nolan, Pat Leahy, Seamus McGuinness, Keith 
Walsh and attendees at seminars in the Department of Finance and in the 
ESRI for their useful comments. The views expressed in the paper are the 
authors’ own and not necessarily those of the Department of Finance or ESRI. 
Looking at the composition of households under 
the different tax scenarios, we find that even with a nar-
row base and high threshold, some households in low 
income deciles are affected. This is because of the 
imperfect correlation between income and wealth. 
PATTERNS OF IRISH HOUSEHOLD WEALTH 
In order to undertake this analysis of the extent of the 
revenue base for a wealth tax and how many house-
holds it would affect depending on threshold levels and 
exemptions, detailed information on the asset and lia-
bility structure of Irish households was required. This 
data is available in the Household Finance and Con-
sumption Survey (HFCS), which was carried out by the 
Central Statistics Office in 2013 in coordination with the 
Central Bank of Ireland (CSO 2015 and Lawless, Lydon 
and McIndoe-Calder 2015). The survey covered over 
5,000 households across the country and included an 
over-sampling of households in more affluent areas to 
maximise the detail on asset holdings of wealthier 
households, where financial structures might be 
expected to be more complex. 
As has been commonly found across countries, 
wealth is very unevenly distributed across Irish house-
holds – the median net wealth is 102,600 euros and the 
mean is over double this amount at 218,700 euros. The 
wealthiest 10% of households hold close to 54% of total 
household wealth and the top three deciles own close 
to 85% of the wealth. The picture is somewhat more 
evenly distributed by income decile, with the top 10% 
of households by income owning one-quarter of total 
wealth. 
In terms of the components of wealth, we find that 
the household’s main residence (HMR) accounts for just 
under half of the value of total gross assets (i.e., not 
adjusted for debt) of Irish households. Farms make up 
a further 20% of asset values and other residential 
property 9%. Overall, Irish households hold almost all 
of their wealth in the form of real assets, with just 12% 
accounted for by financial assets. The largest debts are 
also those associated with property, with outstanding 
mortgages on the household main residence repre-
senting 18% of total gross asset values, while other 
property debts account for another 6%. 
CONSTRUCTING SCENARIOS FOR  
A WEALTH TAX DESIGN
We present a range of hypothetical scenarios 
loosely based on the structure of existing wealth taxes 
across European countries (specifically France, Spain, 
Iceland, Netherlands, Norway and three Swiss can-
tons). This approach allows us to explore the trade-offs 
from adjusting thresholds and asset exemptions. These 
hypothetical tax designs start from broadest possible 
tax base and a low threshold, thereby casting a wide tax 
net, and then examine the impact of applying exemp-
tions to specific assets (especially the HMR) and 
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increasing the qualifying threshold. For all of these dif-
ferent scenarios, we calculate the size of the tax base, 
the percentage of households that would be liable, the 
average tax payment and resulting revenues, as well as 
the distribution of the tax across household types.
The broadness of the wealth tax base is largely 
determined by two main parameters; the application of 
exemptions from, or reductions to, wealth tax liability 
for particular asset types e.g., the household main res-
idence; and varying the level of individual thresholds of 
wealth before entering the wealth tax net. In the hypo-
thetical wealth tax scenarios presented here, these two 
parameters are combined in varying extents to gener-
ate a variety of theoretical wealth bases. Each of these 
scenarios is labelled primarily in reference to these two 
parameters. The higher the individual thresholds, the 
narrower the base and the more assets are exempted 
or reduced in value, the narrower the base too. 
Table 1 shows the main features of each of our 
alternative scenarios. At one extreme, a combination of 
the narrowest of asset bases and the largest individual 
thresholds can be conceived of, similar to the existing 
wealth tax structure in France. In this “High Threshold 
– Large Exemptions” scenario, exemptions2 for the 
household main residence, farms, business assets and 
voluntary pensions (almost three quarters [73.6%] of 
gross assets) are combined with high individual thresh-
olds of 1 million euros (double if married) and 500,000 
euros per child.
At the opposite extreme, bringing together the 
broadest of asset bases and the smallest of individual 
thresholds yields a scenario whereby all positive net 
assets would be liable. In the “All Net Assets” scenario, 
all asset types are included in the base at their full valu-
ation and there is no individual threshold, which would 
reduce individual wealth tax liabilities. In this scenario, 
any household with net assets greater than zero would 
incur a wealth tax liability. The full range of scenarios 
is set out in Table 1, with each scenario varying as the 
2  When particular assets are exempted from liability to wealth tax, the debt 
associated with those assets is still deducted from the remaining assets to 
arrive at net wealth. For example, when the household main residence (HMR) 
is exempted from liability to wealth tax, mortgage debt associated with the 
HMR is still deducted from the remaining gross assets to arrive at net wealth. 
combination of personal threshold and exclusions and 
deductions. For ease of comparison, each of these sce-
narios will be assigned a tax rate of 1%.
The final critical determinant of potential revenue 
yields is, of course, the rate applied. In the results pre-
sented here we show the outcome of having a 1% rate 
applied to all qualifying wealth above the specified 
threshold. As this is a simple proportional rate, the rev-
enue from alternative rates would be a multiple of the 
number reported – a 0.5% rate would half our revenue 
estimates, or a 2% rate would double them, for exam-
ple. The effects of introducing multiple rates would be 
more complex, but their upper and lower bounds can 
be set by these single proportional rate estimates.
TAX BASE, HOUSEHOLD LIABILITY  
AND REVENUE ESTIMATES
Table 2 shows the extent of the coverage of each wealth 
tax scenario and potential total revenues. To begin with 
the highly unrealistic scenario of taxing all positive 
wealth at 1%, this would raise an estimated 3,781 mil-
lion euros and affect 86% of all households. To achieve 
this yield, however, would require taxing lots of people 
who have very little net wealth and possibly low 
incomes. In addition, applying a wealth tax to all house-
holds would present a very large administrative bur-
den. All of the existing wealth tax designs in other coun-
tries apply a minimum wealth threshold for this reason. 
Looking at the results, we see a stark contrast in terms 
of the size of the tax base and the number of house-
holds liable between the very broad-based systems 
and the more narrowly-targeted systems, highlighting 
a distinction between taxing (almost all) wealth and 
taxing the upper part of the distribution of wealthy 
households.
The narrowest tax base that we look at in Table 2 
– the high-threshold, large exemptions case - is rela-
tively similar to a simplified version of the structure of 
the French wealth tax system. It applies a high personal 
allowance threshold, including increases for children, 
and exempts a range of assets such as the main resi-
dence, farms, business and pension wealth. This results 
Table 1
Thresholds and Exemptions for Liability to Wealth Tax by Wealth Tax Scenario
Personal Threshold (euros) Exclusions and Deductions
High Threshold – Large Exemptions 1m (double if married) 500,000 per child Excl. HMR, Farms, Business, &  Pension
No Threshold – Large Exemptions None Excl. HMR, Farms, Business, &  Pension
High Threshold – No Exemptions 1m (double if married) 250,000 per child None
Middle Threshold – No Exemptions 500,000 (double if married) 125,000 per child None
Low Threshold – 50% Deduction 125,000 (double if married) 30,000 per child Excl. Pension AssetsDed. 50% from HMR, Farms & Business
No Threshold – HMR Exempt None Excl. Household Main Residence
Low Threshold -  Large Exemptions 125,000 (double if married) No child allowance Excl. HMR, Farms, Business, & Pension
Low Threshold – No Exemptions 125,000 (double if married) No child allowance None
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in just 1.4% of wealth liable for taxation. The 4,288 lia-
ble households would pay over 12,000 euros each in 
this scenario (Table 3 gives the tax payment estimates 
for liable households) and, in total, this scenario would 
raise 53 million euros in revenue. Keeping the asset 
exemptions in place but removing the personal allow-
ances completely (the no threshold, large exemptions 
scenario) brings 64% of households into the tax net, 
although as the largest assets have been excluded, the 
amount of total wealth liable for taxation is just under 
22%. Many more households are liable to be taxed 
under this scenario, albeit at a considerably lower aver-
age amount (765 euros), resulting in a revenue yield of 
823 million euros.
The effect of taking the opposite course and 
removing all asset exemptions, but restoring the per-
sonal allowances is the basis of the next two scenarios 
presented – high and middle thresholds, both with no 
exemptions. This experiment demonstrates that the 
threshold largely drives the number of households lia-
ble, even when no specific asset exemptions are 
included. Unlike the previous example where excluding 
many assets but having no threshold for remaining 
wealth still resulted in the majority of households fac-
ing some level of wealth tax, both of these scenarios 
would have the wealth tax apply to not much more than 
5% of households. The average tax payment is lower in 
the middle threshold scenario as households with 
lower levels of wealth are included; notwithstanding 
this, the revenue is 2.5 times higher because of the 
larger number of taxpayers. 
In practice most specific country systems take a 
balance of some form between the asset exemption 
and allowance approaches. We therefore take an inter-
mediate approach for the next scenario – low thresh-
old, 50% deduction - with a lower threshold (125,000 
euros for an individual, double if married and an addi-
tional 30,000 euros per child) applied and specific 
assets are provided with an offset of half their value 
(specifically the main residence, farms and businesses, 
while pensions are exempted completely). This sce-
nario brings 18% of households into the scope of a 
wealth tax, with an average tax bill of just under 3,000 
euros per household.
Given the high share of household wealth in Ire-
land accounted for by the household’s main residence, 
we include a scenario of exempting this particular asset 
only with no other allowances or exemptions applied 
(no threshold, HMR exempt). The lack of personal 
allowance in this scenario means that it would bring a 
significant proportion of households into the tax net, 
but by exempting the main asset that most households 
possess, the average payment would be lower than in 
all but one of the other scenarios presented (1,790 
euros). 
The final new scenario reduces the threshold once 
again (low threshold, no exemptions): this time apply-
ing to all wealth above 125,000 euros (doubled for mar-
ried couples but no additional child allowance), per-
haps the broadest feasible base. This threshold 
reduction brings considerably more households into 
the tax net, increasing the percentage liable to almost 
one-third compared to the 6% in the middle threshold, 
no exemptions scenario. This reflects the highly 
non-linear distribution of wealth across households. 
DISTRIBUTION OF LIABILITY
The calculations in the previous section showed the 
percentage of households that would be liable for a 
wealth tax under a range of scenarios. This section 
Table 2











High Threshold – Large Exemptions 5,297 1.4% 4 0.25% 53
No Threshold – Large Exemptions 82,257 22% 1,075 64% 823
High Threshold – No Exemptions 24,753 6% 26 1.5% 248
Middle Threshold – No Exemptions 62,178 16% 95 6% 622
Low Threshold – 50% Deduction 87,151 23% 296 18% 872
No Threshold – HMR Exempt 204,099 54% 1,140 67% 2,041
Low Threshold – Large Exemptions 32,968 9% 96 6% 329
Low Threshold – No Exemptions 205,429 54% 548 32% 2,054
1% tax on all net assets 378,120 100% 1,459 86% 3,781
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 3
Estimated Tax Amounts for Irish Households  
                   Mean payment (euros)
High Threshold – Large Exemptions 12,353
No Threshold – Large Exemptions 765
High Threshold – No Exemptions 9,590
Middle Threshold – No Exemptions 6,565
Low Threshold – 50% Deduction 2,945
No Threshold – HMR Exempt 1,790
Low Threshold – Large Exemptions 3,418
Low Threshold – No Exemptions 3,746
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looks at where these households sit in the income dis-
tribution. Although income and wealth are positively 
correlated, there are a number of reasons why this 
correlation is not perfect. Kaplan, Violante and Weid-
ner (2014) identify the “wealthy hand-to-mouth” as 
households with valuable assets – typically property or 
pension funds – but low incomes. For example, house-
holds may have acquired assets through inheritance, or 
assets they purchased in the past may have had varying 
degrees of capital appreciation (or indeed depreciation 
in the case of households with negative equity prop-
erties). Some farming households may have assets of 
high value that generate modest income streams and 
older households may own mortgage-free property, 
but now be living on a pension income that is consid-
erably lower than their prior employment earnings. 
At the other end of the age distribution, high-income 
young families with recent house purchases may have 
apparently low net wealth relative to their income, as 
they are at a life-cycle stage where asset accumulation 
has only just begun. 
In Table 4, we divide households into ten income 
buckets with an equal number of households in each 
grouping and calculate the percentage of the wealth 
tax that would be paid by each group. The immedi-
ately striking result from this analysis is that, with the 
exception of the very narrowly focused high threshold/
high exemption scenario, all of the other wealth tax 
designs would affect at least some households in all 
of the income bands. Although we find that the bulk of 
the tax revenues would be raised from higher income 
households under all hypothetical tax designs, some 
households at all points in the income distribution 
would find they are liable for some payment in all but 
the first case that combines a high threshold with large 
exemptions. The scenarios where there is no threshold 
at all results in a fairly even spread of liable households 
all across the income distribution, even in cases where 
considerable assets are exempted (such as the “no 
threshold, large exemptions” and “no threshold, HMR 
exempt” cases). 
In order to mitigate against an excessive burden of 
taxation, some systems of wealth taxes (such as those 
in place in France and Spain) have schemes that cap 
the combined (income and wealth) tax payable at 75% 
and 60% of income respectively. We experiment with 
the impact of capping wealth taxes alone at 33% of 
household income for each of the alternative scenarios 
presented earlier.3 For a 1% rate of wealth tax, this is 
equivalent to removing from liability household assets 
that are worth more than 300 times household income. 
A maximum payment cap has an immediate direct 
impact on reducing the revenue associated with each 
scenario, which is largest when middle or high thresh-
olds are combined with no asset exemptions (revenue 
reductions of between -18% and -26%). In the other 
scenarios, the proportionate reductions tend to be 
slightly larger where the initial wealth tax revenue is 
greater.
As the purpose of a maximum payment cap is to 
address concerns regarding the ability to pay for high 
wealth – low income households, it follows that the 
beneficiaries of an income cap on wealth tax payments 
are likely to be those in the highest wealth deciles. 
Broadly speaking, the reduction in tax due to income 
capping would be distributed in much the same pro-
portion as initial burden of wealth tax with, 90% plus 
of the reduction typically benefitting the top wealth 
decile. By contrast, the maximum payment cap would 
benefit households at the lower end of the income dis-
tribution to a much greater extent than the initial 
wealth tax burden on these households. There is a 
U-shaped distribution of benefit of the income cap by 
income decile in that households at either end of the 
income distribution are expected to benefit from the 
reduction in wealth tax. The income cap has a larger 
burden reducing effect among lower income decile 
households when there is a low threshold, or none 
at all.
3  Results are presented in detail in the working paper version of this article, 
available at http://www.esri.ie/pubs/WP549.pdf 
Table 4
Wealth Tax Payment as a Proportion of Gross Income by Income Decile  
Decile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top All Deciles
High Threshold –  
Large Exemptions 2.4% 4.4% 10.1% 4.8% 5.4%
No Threshold – 
Large Exemptions 3.3% 1.4% 0.9% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.5% 1.9% 1.7% 1.6%
High Threshold – 
No Exemptions 16.4% 27.4% 3.5% 4.4% 17.0% 17.1% 8.3% 10.7% 7.5% 5.8% 6.9%
Middle Threshold –  
No Exemptions 40.4% 20.8% 12.2% 8.4% 12.9% 10.4% 9.5% 7.8% 8.4% 4.5% 6.3%
Low Threshold – 
50% Deduction 17.2% 8.7% 5.7% 6.1% 5.7% 5.1% 4.1% 3.9% 4.0% 3.0% 3.9%
No Threshold –  
HMR Exempt 6.1% 4.8% 3.0% 3.5% 3.0% 3.5% 3.3% 3.7% 3.7% 3.4% 3.5%
Low Threshold –  
Large Exemption 15.5% 5.5% 6.6% 9.9% 5.2% 5.5% 3.6% 3.7% 4.2% 2.3% 3.2%
Low Threshold –  
No Exemptions 19.6% 12.2% 9.7% 9.4% 7.7% 7.0% 6.2% 5.4% 5.3% 3.8% 5.4%
All Net Assets 15.7% 9.2% 6.3% 6.1% 5.1% 5.5% 4.5% 4.4% 3.9% 3.7% 4.7%
Source: Authors’ calculations.         
31
FORUM
ifo DICE Report 2 / 2018 June Volume 16
CONCLUSIONS
This paper aims to provide as comprehensive an analy-
sis as possible of the wealth holdings of Irish house-
holds and the potential implications that a wealth tax 
could have, if applied to the existing structure of assets 
and household composition. To provide a broad range 
of estimates and to illustrate the different effects of 
adjusting threshold levels and including or exempting 
specific assets, we calculated our wealth tax revenues 
and households liable using two different approaches. 
The first approach took the existing wealth tax struc-
tures of a number of European countries and applied 
them to the Irish household structure. The second used 
a range of hypothetical combinations of threshold level 
and asset exemptions to go more deeply into their 
respective impacts on the revenues and numbers of 
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